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O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-31 (amended), 9-1031.1 (new), 9-11-9.1 (amended), 9-119.2 (new), 9-11-68 (amended), 24-337.1 (new), 24-9-67 (amended), 24-967.1 (new), 33-3-27 (amended), 43-3437 (amended), 51-1-29.5 (new), 51-25.1 (new), 51-12-31 (amended), 51-1233 (amended), 51-13-1 (new)
SB 3
1
2005 Ga. Laws 1
The Act provides for civil justice
reform in Georgia, amending Titles 9,
24, 33, 43, and 51 of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated. The Act
addresses venue for cases involving
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joint defendants and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. It also amends
procedures relating to affidavits in
professional malpractice cases by
requiring that the plaintiff file, with the
complaint, an affidavit of an expert
competent to testify. In addition, the
Act also requires authorizing the
release of the plaintiff's medical
information in medical malpractice
cases. The Act further provides
guidelines associated with offers of
settlement and the reduction of
frivolous lawsuits. Moreover, the Act
provides that courts shall not admit
certain statements of apology or similar
statements by health care providers as
evidence in civil actions. It also
changes the standards of expert
testimony
and
expert
witness
qualification.
The
Act requires
reporting
instances
of
medical
malpractice judgments and settlements
and provides for investigations and
remedial actions with respect to
physicians' fitness to practice. Further,
the Act addresses liability in the
emergency room context and liability
involving independent contractors. It
also eliminates joint and several
liability in favor of apportionment of
damages according to degree of fault.
The Act also provides a cap on
noneconomic damages in certain
actions relating to health care and
allows for periodic payments over time.
The Act concludes by providing for
severability, designating. an effective
date, and repealing conflicting laws.
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February 16, 2005

History

Tort reform is one of the most polarizing and controversial issues
that society faces today. 1 Year after year, opposing sides set the
battlefield and draw the lines. 2 States throughout the country have
struggled with the issue. 3 The controversy pits Republicans against
Democrats, doctors against lawyers, and business advocates against
consumer advocates. 4
In Georgia, the issue divides not only along party lines but also
within them. 5 In 2004, as in previous years, the Georgia Legislature
unsuccessfully attempted to pass tort reform. 6 In 2004, the focus of
HB 1028 was specifically on medical malpractice. 7 It would have
given rural hospitals the ability to self-insure, provided limited
liability associated with independent contractors, and eliminated joint
and several liability.8 The bill ultimately failed in Conference
Committee over the issue of caps on noneconomic damages. 9
The same players came to the table during the 2005 legislative
session for consideration of SB 3.10 Lawmakers heard many views
throughout the lengthy process--over 20 combined hours of
testimony from both chambers.ll Many claimed Georgia needed tort
reform due to the ever increasing medical malpractice insurance
1. Sonji Iacobs, Panel Weighs Malpractice Issue; Tort Refonn Would Cap Injury Awards,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Ian. 25, 2005, at B 1.
2. See id.
3. See Douglas Heller & Allison Wall, 'Cap' Cheats Patients and Doctors, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Feb. 3,2005, atPL15.
4. See id.; Greg Bluestein, More Get in on the Tort Refonn Act, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan.
26, 2005, at 26; Bill Rankin, LEGISLATURE '05: THE BIG ISSUES: Malpractice Fight Renewed; As

Republicans Take Over House, Doctors, Lawyers Prepare to Slug it Out Again Over Jury Awards and
Medical Liability, ATLANTA I. CONST., Jan. 2,2005, at CI.
5. Rankin, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Review of Selected 2004 Georgia Legislation, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 178,182-94 (2004).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bluestein, supra note 4; Greg Bluestein, Bar Won't Budge on Tort Reform, FuLTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Jan. 19,2005, at 19; Rankin, supra note 4.
11. See
PLudio
Recording
of
Senate
Proceedings,
Feb.
1,
2005,
http://www.georgia.gov/00/artic1eJO,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,00.html [hereinafter Senate PLudioj;
Audio
Recording
of
House
Proceedings,
Feb.
10,
2005,
hnp:l/www.georgia.gov/00/artic1eJO,2086,4802_61 07103_33078458,00.html [hereinafter House Audio j;
Greg Bluestein, Damages Caps Divide House GOP, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 8, 2005, at 8.
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premiums resulting from large jury awards and settlements. 12
Specifically, the Medical Association of Georgia feared that without
tort reform, they would not be able to attract and retain an adequate
number of doctors to sustain the state's needs. 13 Additionally, the
Georgia Chamber of Commerce believed that "tort reform would
translate into a better business climate" for the state. 14 In particular,
the National Federation of Independent Business felt that with civil
justice reform, small businesses would be less of a target for trial
lawyers. 15
While many voiced the need for civil justice reform, opponents
saw tort reform as coming at too great a cost. 16 The opponents argued
tort reform will restrict access to the courts and deny victims the right
to compensation for their injuries. 17 Further, they claimed tort reform
will hinder wrongdoers' accountability for their acts. IS They also
argued that while many other states have enacted tort reform
legislation, the overwhelming majority have not seen a reduction in
insurance premiums. 19
Bill Tracking of SB 3
Consideration by the Senate

Senators Preston Smith, Eric Johnson, Mitch Seabaugh, Bill
Stephens, and William Hamrick of the 52nd, 1st, 28th, 27th, and 30th
districts, respectively, sponsored SB 3. 20 The Senate first read the bill
on January 11, 2005, and the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably
reported the bill, by substitute, on January 28,2005. 21
12. Jay Bookman. For Cruelty. Malpractice Cap Tops All. ATLANTA J. CONST.• Feb. 14. 2005. at
All.
13. Bluestein. supra note 4.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See discussion infra notes 16-IS.
17. Rankin. supra note 4.
IS. Bluestein. supra note 4.
19. Weiss Ratings. Inc .• The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, Claims
Payout
Levels,
and
Availability
of
Coverage.
June
3.
2002.
http://www.weissmtings.comlmalpmctice.asp.
20. See SB 3. as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
21. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3. Jan. II. 2005 (May II, 2005); State of
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet. SB 3, Jan. 2S, 2005 (May II. 2005).
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The Bill, As Introduced
As introduced, SB 3 would have amended Titles 9, 24, and 51 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 22 Lawmakers proposed to
amend various civil procedure rules, evidence rules, and tort laws. 23
Its sponsors introduced the bill as a response to the rising cost of
hospital and medical liability insurance while also addressing the
need for general reform regarding civil actions. 24
Section 2 of the bill, as introduced, replaced Code section 9-10-31
and inserted in its place a revised section 9-10-31 and the new section
9-10-31.1, which addressed venue in cases with joint defendants. 25
The proposed section allows plaintiffs to bring a case in a jurisdiction
where one of the defendants resides, but it permits transferring the
case to an appropriate venue if the plaintiff drops that defendant from
the suit. 26
As introduced, section 3 of the bill focused on expert testimony in
professional malpractice cases. 27 It amended Code section 9-11-9.1
by requiring contemporaneous filings of affidavits in all
circumstances without exception. 28
As introduced, section 4 of the bill created new Code section 9-119.2, requiring contemporaneous filing of a medical authorization
form with the complaint in medical malpractice actions. 29 The
authorization allows the attorneys representing the defendant "to
obtain and disclose protected health information" from medical
records, except privileged information, to assist in "the investigation,
evaluation, and defense of . . . allegations set forth in the
complaint. ,,30 The authorization allows "the defendant's attorney
[the] right to discuss the care and treatment of the plaintiff ... with
the plaintiffs ... physicians.,,3l Failure to attach this authorization
can result in dismissal of the suit. 32
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

SB
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
SB
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.

3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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Section 5 of the bill, as introduced, proposed the addition of Code
section 9-15-16, which would penalize either the plaintiff or the
defendant for rejecting a reasonable offer of judgment by requiring
them to pay the opposing party's attorney's fees. 33 The bill provided
specific instructions for offer of judgment procedures by setting out
offer requirements and adding separate penalty provisions for
defendants and plaintiffs. 34 One provision states:
if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by
the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to
recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by him or
her or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to a policy of liability
insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if
the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by
the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the
court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the
award. 3s

The bill also provided specific language relating to the plaintiff by
requiring that:
[i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted
by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a
judgment in an amount of at least 25 percent greater than the
offer, he or she shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred from the date of the ftling of the
demand. 36

In addition, the bill provided a "bad faith" exception allowing the

court to determine whether to impose the penalty.37

33. [d.
34. SB
35. [d.
36. [d.
37. Jd.

3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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Section 6 added Code section 24-3-37.1 relating to the
admissibility of admissions by health care providers. The section
provided:
any and all statements, afftrmations, gestures, activities or
conduct expressing benevolence, regret, apology, sympathy,
commiseration, condolence, compassion, fault, or a general
sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider
or an employee or agent of a health care provider to the patient, a
relative of a patient, or representative of the patient [relating] to
the unanticipated outcome shall be inadmissible as evidence ...
38

Section 7 completely replaced Code section 24-9-67. 39 The new
section codified the Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony, and in professional malpractice actions, it provided that
expert opinions regarding the appropriate standard of care is
admissible only if the expert holds a proper state license. 4O
Additionally, in medical malpractice actions, the section required that
the expert has "actual professional knowledge and experience in the
area of practice or specialty" and regularly engages in active practice
in that area for a specified amount of time prior to the action, taught
in the specific area of practice at least part-time at an accredited
teaching institution, or "any combination of the active practice or the
teaching ... for at least three of the last five years.'.41
Section 8 added new Code section 51-1-29.5, which addressed the
special nature of the emergency room environment. 42 The section
required plaintiffs to prove "willful or wanton misconduct" in order
to recover for noneconomic damages in that setting. 43 These
limitations to liability did not apply to any act or omission while
rendering care or assistance unrelated to the original medical
condition that occurs 24 hours after the hospital began giving such
38. [d.
39. [d.
40. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
42. [d.
43. [d.
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care. 44 Additionally, the limitations did not apply to any act or
omission during the. rendering of care to a pregnant woman in active
labor or who has previously received prenatal care from that hospital
for that pregnancy.45
Section 9 provided new Code section 51-2-5.1, which limited
hospital liability to actions of their agents and employees, provided
specific guidelines hospitals must follow to inform the public to
relieve liability from actions of independent contractors, and required
patients to sign a waiver relating to limiting such liability.46 The bill
set forth factors for determining whether someone is an agent or
independent contractor for liability purposes. 47
Section 10 replaced Code section 51-12-31, providing that in a
case brought against several joint tortfeasors, a plaintiff may only
recover damages against a defendant who was actually liable for the
injury.48 The bill also replaced Code section 51-12-33 with a new
section requiring the fact-finder to determine the percentage of
negligence of the plaintiff and to reduce the amount of damages in
proportion to that negligence. 49 Additionally, the fact-finder will
apportion the damages among the defendants who are actually liable
according to the degree of fault for each party, thus eliminating joint
and several liability and any right of contribution. 50 Further, if the
plaintiff is 50% or more liable, the bill eliminates the plaintiff s
ability to recover any damages. 51
Section 11 added a new Chapter 13, capping noneconomic
damages at $250,000 regardless of the number of health care
providers involved.52 Additionally, it provided a $500,000 cap for
medical facilities regardless of the total number of defendant medical
facilities. 53 Thus, the aggregate amount of noneconomic damages
could not exceed $750,000. 54

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. SB 3, as introduced,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. SB 3, as introduced,
54. Id.

2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.

2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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Section 12 provided for an effective date of July 1,2005 and made
retroactive all actions not arising under Code sections 51-12-31, 5112-33, and 51-13-1. 55

Senate Committee Substitute
The Senate Committee substitute greatly modified the bill. 56 First,
it amended Titles 33 and 43. 57 Additionally, where section 2 of the
bill as introduced allowed the plaintiff to select the venue when there
were two or more defendants, the substitute required the court to
make that determination. 58
Section 3, addressing affidavits, originally required a defendant to
file a motion to dismiss with the original responsive pleading. 59 The
substitute allowed that filing on or before the close of discovery.60
In section 5, the Committee substitute changed the language used
in the explanation of the penalty provision by substituting "offeror"
and "offeree" instead of specifically referring to the plaintiff and
defendant. 6I Additionally, it created a standard for nonmonetary
claims that are more favorable than the last offer. 62 It also added that
any offer must remain open for 30 days.63 If an offer is withdrawn
before that time, the penalty provision does not apply.64 The section
also allowed the prevailing party to move for the fact-finder to
determine, in a separate hearing, whether the opposing party
presented a frivolous claim or defense and whether to impose
damages. 65 The substitute then eliminated the factors for determining
the reasonableness of awarding attorney's fees. 66
The substitute eliminated "fault" from section 6 and replaced it
with "mistake" and "error.,,67
55. [d.
56. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB
57. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB
58. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB
59. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
60. SB 3(SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
61. [d.
62. [d.
63. [d.

3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.

64. [d.
65. [d.

66. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB
67. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB
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Under section 7, the substitute provided that a doctor of osteopathy
can testify regarding the standard of care of a medical doctor and vice
versa. 68 Additionally, an expert who is a physician can testify
regarding the standard of care of nurses as long as he has supervised,
taught, or instructed nurses in three of the past five years, but nurses
cannot testify as to the standard of care of the doctor. 69 Section 7 also
specifically provided that when interpreting this Code section, courts
are to draw on SUfreme Court rulings, such as Daubert, and other
federal precedent. 7
The substitute added a new section 8 to the bill, requiring every
medical malpractice insurer to notify the Composite State Board of
Medical Examiners when it pays a judgment or enters into an
agreement, regardless of dollar amount, within 30 days ofpayment. 71
The substitute added a new section 9 to the bill which amended
Code section 43-34-37, requiring the Board to investigate any doctors
'involved in medical mal~ractice cases with judgments or settlements
in excess of $100,000. 2 Additionally, the Board will assess the
licensee's fitness to practice medicine if the Board disciplined the
licensee three times in the last ten years as a result of a medical
malpractice action. 73
The substitute then took section 8 of the bill as introduced and
renamed it section 10.74 That section expanded the limitation beyond
purely noneconomic damages to include all damages. 75 Additionally,
it required the fact-finder to determine whether the service provider
met the standard of care and gave factors to use in making that
determination. 76 The substitute also eliminated the f,rovision that
limited liability relating to specific circumstances. 7 Further, it
changed the standard of proof from "preponderance of the evidence"
to "clear and convincing.,,78
68. SB 3(SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc .. 509 U.s. 579 (1993); Gen. Eiec. Co. v.
Ioiner. 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ud. v. Carmichael. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
71. SB 3(SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see generally Daubert v.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Compare id.. with SB 3. as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen.

Assem.
75. SB 3(SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
76. Id.
77. Compare SB 3(SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .. with SB 3, as introduced. 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
78. Compare SB 3(SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3. as introduced. 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol22/iss1/23
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The substitute changed section 12 by allowing the consideration of
all involved in the event, even nonparties, in apportioning fault. 79
The Committee amended section 13 to exclude earning capacity
and domestic and other necessary services performed without
compensation from the definition of noneconomic damages. 80
The substitute added a new section 14 providing that if any section
is struck down as unconstitutional, the remaining provisions will
remain in full force. 81
The substitute changed the effective date from July 1, 2005 to the
day the Governor signed the bill. It also included sections 51-1-29.5
and 51-2-5.1 to the list of sections not affected by the retroactivity
provision. 82
Senate Motion and Debate to Engross

Senator Preston Smith, the bill's sponsor, strongly encouraged
engrossing the bill because "[e]xperience has taught us that there are
certain bills that are not well perfected on the floor of the Senate. ,,83
He recounted what happened to the prior year's tort reform bill: 163
pages of amendments clogged the Senate floor with debate and
destroyed the bilL 84 He then urged his fellow senators to take a
different approach and engross this year's bill. 85 Several senators
strongly opposed engrossing such a highly contentious bill and felt
they should debate more. 86 They noted that engrossment is a rare
congressional action, especially on a controversial bill of such high
importance. 87 The Senate voted 29 to 25 to engross the bill. 88 As a
result of the engrossment, the Senate floor did not hear several
proposed amendments, including a substitute. 89
79. SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith).
85. Id.
86. See id. (remarks by Sens. Robert Brown, Steve Thompson, & David Adelman).
87. Id.; see also Interview with Sen. Kasim Reed, Senate District No. 35 (Apr. 13,2005) [hereinafter
Reed Interview1("[Elngrossing a bill as important as this piece of legislation was cowardly and I think it
was particularly thoughtless, considering how substantial the impact is of this bill.").
88. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 1,2005).
89. See Reed Interview, supra note 87.
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Senate Floor Debate

During the floor debate, a number of senators spoke in support and
in opposition of the bill. 90 The bill's sponsor, Senator Preston Smith
of the 52nd district, introduced the bill. 91 He provided a section by
section analysis, discussed the major policy initiatives in Georgia,
and addressed various questions from the floor regarding the effect
caps would have on Georgia citizens' access to legal representation
and the perceived discriminatory nature of a noneconomic cap.92
Senator Smith indicated that he primarily supported the bill in an
effort to increase overall access to quality health care. 93
Senator Judson Hill of the 32,nd district gave a narrative of his
personal experiences resulting from medical malpractice, yet he still
rose in support of the bill: "We as leaders must weigh the needs of
the many while considering the needs of a few.,,94 Later, Senator
Tommie Williams of the 19th district spoke in support of the bill due
to his belief that the current medical crisis is forcing doctors to
practice "defensive medicine" instead of focusing on what is best for
the patient. 95 Senator John Wiles of the 37th district spoke in favor of
the bill by focusing on the effect of tort reform in other states and the
need to reduce frivolous lawsuits. 96 Finally, Senator Don R. Thomas
of the 54th district spoke in favor of the bill based on the need to
retain specialized physicians and help small businesses. 97
Various senators also rose in opposition of the bill. 98 Senator Steve
Thompson of the 33rd district opposed the bill because he did not
believe a health care crisis existed or that a cap would lower
insurance premiums. 99 Senator Gloria Butler of the 56th district
spoke against the bill because she believed in holding people
accountable for their actions and maintaining access for redress. 100
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Senate Audio, supra note II.
[d. (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith).
/d.
[d.
[d. (remarks by Sen. Judson Hill).
[d. (remarks by Sen. Tommie Williams).
See Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. John Wiles).
See ill. (remarks by Sen. Don R. Thomas).
See ill. (remarks by Sens. Steve Thompson, Gloria Butler, Kasim Reed, & Emanuel Jones).
See id. (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson).
See id. (remarks by Sen. Gloria Butler).
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Senator Kasim Reed of the 35th district spoke out against SB 3
because he believed caps would deny access to the legal system and
competent legal representation. 101 He also expressed his view that
there are very few unwarranted, excessive jury verdicts. 102 He
identified California as a state where tort reform had failed to reduce
insurance premiums, arguing that insurance reform was the only
answer to the issue of high premiums. 103 Senator Emanuel Jones of
the 10th district favored tort reform, but he implored the Senate to
consider SB 36 instead of SB 3 because SB 36 provided for equal
protection while also providing equal access to affordable health
care. 104 Finally, Senator Preston Smith closed the debate by stressing
the need to consider the practical reality instead of focusing on an
ideal solution. 105 The Senate passed SB 3 by a vote of 39 to 15. 106
Consideration by the House

The House first read SB 3 on February 3, 2005. 107 Although
Speaker Glenn Richardson split the House Judiciary Committee into
two groups at the beginning of the session for the sake of efficiency,
ultimately the Speaker assigned the bill to a Special Committee on
Civil Justice Reform instead of the House Judiciary Committee. 108
The House read SB 3 for the second time, and the Committee
favorabl y reported on February 7, 2005. 109 The House read the bill
for the third time and passed it on February 10,2005. 110

101. See id. (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed).
102. See Senate Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed).
103. See id.
104. See id. (remarks by Sen. Emanuel Jones).
105. See id. (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith).
106. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 1,2005).
107. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 3,2005 (May 11,2005).
108. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 3, 2005 (May II, 2005); Greg
Bluestein, New Judiciary Leaders Gear Up for Next Round on Tort Reform, FuLTON COUNTY DAlLY
REp., Jan. 12,2005, at 12.
109. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 7, 2005 (May II, 2005).
110. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 10, 2005 (May 11, 2005).
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House Committee Substitute

Under section 2, the House Committee resurrected the vanishing
venue provision and codified forum non conveniens. III Under section
3, the House Committee added audiologists and speech language
pathologists as professions to which the code section applies. 112
Under section 5, the House Committee limited the offer of judgment
provision to tort claims for money, eliminated the nonmonetary
relief, and required service by certified mail. ll3 Under section 7, the
House Committee provided for the admissibility of all expert
opinions in criminal actions by inserting Code section 24-9-67 and
moving the Senate's codification of D,aubert to Code section 24-967.1. 1l4 Under section 10, the House Committee added additional
definitions to the emergency room provision, took out the provision
covering an unborn child, and listed different examples of the factors
needed to detennine whether the health care provider met the
standard of care.1l5 Under Section 11, the House Committee added
audiologists and speech pathologists to the list defining health care
professionals. 116
House Floor Debates and Amendments

Prior to the third reading of the bill, representatives gave four floor
amendments to the members of the House. II7 Speaker Glenn
Richardson of the 19th district and Representative Earl Ehrhart of the
36th district proposed Amendment 1 to the Committee substitute. II8
This amendment changed the standard to recover under section 10
from "willful and wanton" to "gross negligence" in the emergency
room context. 1l9 The House adopted Amendment 1 without

Ill. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
112. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
113. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
114. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms .• Inc .• 509 U.s. 579 (1993).
115. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
116. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Asscm .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
117. See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
118. See S8 3 (HCSHFA). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
119. [d.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol22/iss1/23

14

: TORTS AND CIVIL PRACTICE Civil Practice and Procedure Generally:
2005]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

235

objection. 12o Representatives Edward Lindsey of the 54th district and
Wendell Willard of the 49th district proposed Amendment 2, which
created an exception to noneconomic caps by allowing greater
recovery for catastrophic injury. 121 Amendment 2 failed by one
vote. 122 Speaker Glenn Richardson and Representative Earl Ehrhart
proposed Amendment 3, which raised the noneconomic damages cap
to $350,000 from any single medical facility, $700,000 when there
are multiple medical. facilities, and a maximum cap of $1,050,000
under section 13.123 The House adopted the amendment without
objection. 124 Representatives Wendell Willard and Edward Lindsey
introduced Amendment 4, which proposed specific criteria for health
care providers testifying as to the applicable standard of care. 125
Amendment 4 failed by a vote of 38 to 134. 126
During the floor debate, a number of representatives spoke in favor
and against SB 3 and the various proposed amendments. 127 House
Majority Leader Jerry Keen of the 179th district spoke to support the
passage of SB 3 because he believed it would ensure better access to
health care for all Georgians. 128 Representative Barry Fleming of the
117th district gave a section by section explanation of the bill. 129
Representative Tom Rice of the 51st district based his support of SB
3 on simple economics. 130 The simple economics were comprised of
three factors: the increase in insurance premiums, the number of
insurance companies leaving the state, and the number of medical
specialists and facilities leaving the state. 131 He also provided an
explanation for the reasonableness of the cap by noting that the
average jury award for pain and suffering was approximately
$250,000. 132
120. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005).
121. See Failed House Hoor Amendment to SB 3, introduced by Reps. Edward Lindsey and Wendell
Willard, Feb. 10, 2005.
122. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10, 2005).
123. See SB 3 (HCSHFA), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
124. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005).
125. See Failed House Hoor Amendment to SB 3, introduced by Reps. Edward Lindsey and Wendell
Willard, Feb. 10, 2005.
126. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005).
127. See House Audio, supra note II.
128. [d. (remarks by Rep. Jerry Keen).
129. [d. (remarks by Rep. Barry Heming).
130. [d. (remarks by Rep. Tom Rice).
131. [d.
132. [d.
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Representative Sue Burmeister of the 119th district also spoke in
favor of SB 3 because it would provide access to health care for
everyone, specifically poor women. 133 Representative Ron Dodson of
the 74th district supported SB 3 because he understood that under the
present system, medical facilities were leaving the state. 134
Various representatives also spoke in opposition of SB 3.135
Representative David Ralston of the 7th district, although in favor of
tort reform, did not like some of the details contained in SB 3.136 He
did not like the idea of putting a value on human life and wanted
concrete data relating to the impact of insurance on doctors, rather
than only malpractice suitS.137 Representative Rich Golick of the 34th
district opposed SB 3 because he believed that government should
not put itself in the place of juries and the right to trial by jury should
"remain an inviolate right" as guaranteed by both the federal and
Georgia Constitutions. 138 Representative Edward Lindsey of the 54th
district opposed the bill because he believed SB 3 only acted as "a
band-aid on a problem that needs surgery" and did not adequately
address the important issues.139 Representative Fran Millar of the
79th district wanted to strengthen SB 3 through adding Amendments
1,2, and 4. 140 Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Wendell
Willard, spoke out against how the House conducted the process. 141
Although he had proposed two different amendments addressing the
need for a catastrophic injury exception, he was angry that the House
only presented the one coupled with a $750,000 cap, instead of a
$350,000 cap, for a vote. 142 He recognized that many would consider
a cap of $750,000 too high but felt that a catastrophic injury
exception was far too important of an issue for a high cap to block it
and urged the House to pass Amendment 2.143 Representative Jill
Chambers of the 81st district, Tom Bordeaux of the 162nd district,
133. See House Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Rep. Sue Burmeister).
134. [d. (remarks by Rep. Ron Dodson).
135. [d. (remarks by Reps. David Ralston, Rich Golick, Edward Lindsey, Fran Millar, & Wendell
Willard).
136. [d (remarks by Rep. David Ralston).
137. [d.
138. [d. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick).
139. See id. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey).
140. House Audio, supra note 11.
141. [d. (remarks by Rep. Wendell Willard).
142. [d.
143. [d.
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and Representative Vance Smith of the 129th district also spoke in
support of Amendment 2.144 Instead of supporting Amendment 2,
Representative Dean Douglas of the 59th district urged voting against
all caps and voting against SB 3 in its entirety. 145
Representative Barry Flemming of the 117th district and Chairman
of the Special Committee on Civil Justice Reform, rose to speak
against Amendment 4 and Amendment 2 and urged voting for the
original bill instead. 146 House Speaker Glenn Richardson then rose in
support of Amendment l' s change in the emergency room care
standard from willful and wanton negligence to gross negligence and
Amendment 3' s cap increase from $250,000 to $350,000. 147
The House passed the amended Committee substitute to SB 3 by a
vote of 136 to 34. 148
Senate Reconsideration

Senator Preston Smith, the bill's sponsor, s,Ps0ke in support of a
motion to agree to the House changes to SB 3. 1 9 He summarized the
major changes the House made to each section of the bill. 150 He
concluded with a plea to adopt the House version of SB 3. 151 During
questioning, Senator Smith noted that Mag Mutual, Georgia's largest
medical malpractice insurance provider, indicated it would continue
to honor the 10% rollback of insurance premiums upon the adoption
of the House version of SB 3. 152
Several senators rose in opposition of the motion to agree. 153
Senator Steve Thompson of the 33rd district urged further
consideration by a Conference Committee and stressed that the
amendment for the $750,000 cap only failed in the House by one

144. See id. (remarks by Reps. Jill Chambers, Tom Bordeaux, & Vance Smith)
145. [d. (remarks by Rep. Dean Douglas).
146. House Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Rep. Barry Fieming).
147. [d. (remarks by Rep. Glenn Richardson).
148. [d.
149. See
Audio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb.

10,
2005,
http://www.georgia.gov/00/articleJO,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,OO.htrnl [hereinafter Senate Audio
m(remarks by Sen. Preston Smith).

150.
151.
152.
153.

[d.
[d.
[d.

[d.

(remarks by Sens. Steve Thompson, Robert Brown, & Seth Harp).
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vote, thus demonstrating the need for further debate. 154 Senator
Robert Br.own of the 26th district strongly urged the Senate to send
the bill to Conference Committee because the senators had not had an
opportunity to debate the bill due to engrossment.1 55 Finally, Senator
Seth Harp of the 29th district expressed concern that the bill
"cheapen[ed] life" because gross negligence was still too high of a
standard and the emergency room provision granted immunity for all
damages, not just noneconomic damages. 156 The motion to agree
failed by a vote of 28 to 27. 157

Senate Adoption of House Substitute
On February 14, 2005, Senator Preston Smith again rose to speak
in favor of adopting the House Substitute to SB 3. 158 He warned that
if the Senate did not adopt the House Substitute, the bill would have
to go to the Conference Committee where the Senate would urge
passing the $250,000 cap as well as the other provisions originally
passed by the Senate. 159 He further warned that if the bill went to
Conference Committee, the Committee could lower the cap even
further. 160 Instead of risking the uncertainty of the bill going through
Conference Committee, he felt that adopting the House Substitute
was a "reasonable and necessary compromise.,,161
Senator David Adelman from the 42nd district then rose in
opposition to the adoption of the House substitute to SB 3. 162 He
specifically addressed the provision regarding the standard of proof
necessary for recovery in an emergency room setting. 16 He
expressed his opinion that requiring proof of gross negligence by
clear and convincing evidence was too burdensome, especially in a

154. See Senate Audio n, supra note 149 (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson).
155. [d. (remarks by Sen. Robert Brown).
156. [d. (remarks by Sen. Seth Harp).
157. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005).
158. See
Audio
Recording
of
Senate
Proceedings,
Feb.
14,
2005,
hnp:/Iwww.georgia.gov/00/artic1e/O,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,oo.html [hereinafter Senate Audio
(remarks by Sen. Preston Smith).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. [d. (remarks by Sen. David Adelman).
163. [d.

1m
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case of catastrophic injury. 164 He wanted the bill to go to Conference
Committee to slow the process down and fix the bill at that time,
instead of gambling on the legislature amending the bill later. 165
Senator Steve Thompson of the 33rd district also voiced concerns
about relying on promises that the legislature would fix the bill later
and instead urged sending the bill to Conference Committee. 166
Senator Robert Brown of the 26th district described the bill as
"flawed" and encouraged sending the bill to a Conference
Committee. 167 Senator Kasim Reed of the 35th district also spoke in
opposition of passing the House Substitute and referenced the
Senate's prior vote against the House Substitute!68 He warned that
although many took "heat" for their votes, it was the best vote for the
people. 169 In the end, the Senate adopted the House Substitute by a
vote of 38 to 15. 170
Analysis
Constitutional Issues

Georgia's Tort Reform Act has already faced and will continue to
face constitutional challenges to many of its provisions. Unclear
language and apparently conflicting goals in a number of areas have
left the law open to vagueness challenges. 171 Furthermore, where the
law appears to favor defendants over plaintiffs, plaintiffs will
challenge the law on equal protection grounds. l72 Also, certain
portions of the Act may violate specific provisions in the Georgia
Constitution. 173

164. Senate Audio ill, supra note 158 (remarks by Sen. David Adelman).
165. [d.
166. [d. (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson).
167. [d. (remarks by Sen. Robert Brown).
168. [d. (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed).
169. [d.
170. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3(Feb. 14, 2005).
171. See Ted Carter, Tort Reform lAw May Need Overhaul, Bus. REP. &J., Mar. 28, 2005,
http://www.savannahbusiness.comlmain.asp?SectionlD=29&articleid=2877.
172. [d.
173. See Greg Bluestein, DeKalb Judge Deals First Blow to Tort Reform lAw, FuLTON COUNTY
DAILY REp., Mar. 23, 2005, at 1.
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One general challenge to the Act as a whole could come under
Georgia's single subject rule. 174 The Georgia Constitution provides
that "no bill shall pass which refers to m~re than one subject matter
or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title
thereof.,,175 While opponents have argued that this Act is truly
omnibus legislation, Georgia courts have held that so long as there is
some relationship between subjects within an act, there is no
constitutional violation. 176
On March 21, 2005, DeKalb State Court Judge J. Antonio
DelCampo ruled that Code section 9-10-31(c) of the Tort Reform
Act's section 2 conflicted with venue provisions in the Georgia
Constitution. 177 Code section 9-10-31(c) allows any nonresident
defendant in a medical malpractice action to transfer the action to that
defendant's home county if that is where the events giving rise to the
claim occurred. 178 But the Georgia Constitution provides that "[s]uits
against . . . joint tortfeasors . . . residing in different counties may be
tried in either county." 179 Noting that statutes cannot vary
constitutional venue provisions, Judge DelCampo held that this
statutory venue provision impermissibly narrowed the plaintiff s
rights under Georgia's Constitution. 180 The Georgia Supreme Court
has subsequently granted an interlocutory appeal to this decision,
which will lead to the fITst ultimate decision as to the constitutionality
of any portion of the Act. 181
Of all of the provisions in SB 3, the Act's offer of judgment
provision is perhaps the most likely to see a challenge for
vagueness. 182 While it is clear that the purpose of the provision is to
encourage parties in tort cases to accept legitimate offers for
settlement, it is unclear as to what constitutes a reasonable offer and
what consequences will ensue if a party does not accept that offer. 183
174. See Charles M. Cork, m, Constitutional Issues, Materials for SB 3 Seminar, 8-9 (Mar. I, 2005)
(on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
175. GA. CONST. art. m, § V, para. m.
176. See Cork, supra note 174.
177. Bluestein, supra note 173.
178. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31 (Supp. 2005).
179. GA. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. IV.
180. See Bluestein, supra note 173.
181. 2005 Granted Interlocutory Applications, Supreme Court of Georgia, http://www.gasupreme.us
(last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (remitted to lower court, case no. S0511162, EHCA Cartersville v. Turner).
182. See Chance, supra note 176; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (Supp. 2005).
183. See Chance, supra note 176.
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Subsection (b) provides that when a party receiving a settlement offer
("the offeree") does not accept that offer and later fails to obtain a
judgment "at least 25 percent more favorable than [that] offer," the
offeree is liable for attorney's fees and costs. 184 However, Subsection
(d) of the Act also sets forth a method for determining the
reasonableness of an offer: "If the offer of judgment was 25 percent
more favorable than the monetary award, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees and costS.,,185
Thus, although the subsections both serve the purpose of
encouraging settlement, they also support different methods of
calculation, possibly depending on who makes the offer. 186 For
instance, if the defendant makes the offer, it is unclear whether the
plaintiff must obtain a judgment that exceeds that offer by at least
25%, or whether the offer must have been less than 75% of the final
judgment. 187 Furthermore, if the plaintiff makes the offer, it is unclear
whether the defendant must receive a judgment equal to 75% of the
last offer or less, or whether that offer must not have exceeded the
final judgment by 25%.188 Ultimately, when calculating these
percentages, the critical question is which number-"offer" or
"judgment"-is the numerator and which is the denominator. 189 The
answer to that question is not clear from the text of the Act, making
due process challenges to this provision likely.190 Furthermore,
because this provision applies only to tort claims, it could be subject
to equal protection challenges as well. 191
The Act's adoption, in section 7, of the Daubert standard for the
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, creates the potential
for a challenge on an equal protection basis. 192 By adopting more
stringent requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony in
184.
185.
186.
187.

See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (Supp. 2005).
See id.
See Chance, supra note 176.
See AI Pearson, Offer of Settlement in

188.
189.
190.
191.

[d.

Georgia, Materials for SB 3 Seminar (Mar. 1,2005) (on
file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
See id.
[d.

[d.

192. Robert E. Shields & Lesley J. Bryan, Georgia's New Expert Witness Rule: Daubert and More, in
INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, GEORGIA'S NEWLY ENACTED 2005 TORT REFORM
LAW, SENATE BILL 3, ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE TIPs 20 (2005); O.c.G.A. § 24-9-67 (Supp. 2005);
Daubert v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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civil cases than in criminal cases, the legislature has varied the
admissibility of expert testimony depending on whether that
testimony is presented in a criminal case or a civil case. 193
Furthermore, the intent that "the courts of the State of Georgia not be
viewed as open to expert testimony that would not be admissible in
other states" creates another constitutional question of vagueness. 194
Since different states use different standards for the admissibility of
expert testimony, is the legislature directing the state courts to refuse
to admit evidence that no other state would admit?195 Does Georgia
now have the "strictest" standards for the admissibility of expert
testimony, or does a state court merely need to ensure it does not
allow testimony that no other state would allow?196 Again, because
the text does not answer these questions, it is likely that this provision
is also ripe for constitutional challenges. 197
Plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice claims can challenge caps
on damages for violation of equal protection on the grounds that the
Act treats medical malpractice victims and other tort victims
differently.198 Similarly, these plaintiffs can challenge such caps on
the grounds that they treat less seriously injured plaintiffs differently
from these more seriously injured by allowing the former to receive
total compensation for their injuries while preventing the latter from
doing SO.199 Courts in other states are split on whether or not these
arguments justify invalidating such provisions. 2oo Recently, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down that state's cap on
noneconomic damages, noting that where "the legislature shifts the
economic burden of medical malpractice from insurance companies
and negligent health care providers to a small group of vulnerable,
injured patients, the legislative action does not appear rational.,,201
Another argument for the unconstitutionality of caps is that by
altering the jury's ability to give awards that it sees fit, caps deprive
193. Shields & Bryan, supra note 192; O.C.O.A. § 24-9-67 (supp. 2005); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
194. Shields & Bryan, supra note 192; O.CO.A. § 24-9-67 (supp. 2005); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
195. See Shields & Bryan, supra note 192.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory
Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R. 5th 245, 266 (2005).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients' Compo Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 466 (Wis. 2005).
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parties of the right to trial by jury guaranteed under the Seventh
Amendment. 202 Again, courts in other states have split on whether
caps on recovery violate the Seventh Amendment. 203 A plaintiff
could make a similar argument that this provision violates a
plaintiff s access to the court system, which the Georgia Constitution
guarantees. 204
Section 15 of the Act indicates that, with the exception of the
provisions relating to joint and several liability, emergency medical
care, agency, and caps on noneconomic damages, the Act intends to
apply to future claims as well as all pending cases, unless such
retroactive application would be unconstitutiona1. 205 This has already
created some litigation as to whether or not retroactive application of
a particular provision is unconstitutiona1. 206 Judge Melodie Clayton
in the State Court of Cobb County and Judge Hermann Coolidge in
the State Court of Chatham County have both already ruled that
application of the Daubert expert testimony standards to cases in
which the parties have prepared for trial under the previous, less strict
standards would violate due process?07 Parties are already litigating
the constitutionality of retroactive application of the new affidavit
requirements in malpractice cases. 208
Federal Preemption Issues
In section 4, the Act added Code section 9-11-9.2 to require a

medical malpractice plaintiff to file a medical authorization form at
the time he files the complaint or risk dismissal?09 This form
authorizes the defendant's attorney to obtain and disclose private
information contained in medical records pertaining to the
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.").
203. See Crocca, supra note 198.
204. See GA. CONST. art. L§ I, para. IV.
205. See O.c.G.A. §§ 51-12-31, 51-12-33, 51-1-29.5, 51-2-51.1, & 51-13-1 (Supp. 2005).
206. See Interview with Stephen Chance, Esq., Partner & Joe Watkins, Esq., Partner, Watkins, Lourie,
Roll, & Chance, P.C., in Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 18,2005).
207. See Ken Shigley, Retroactive Application of New Expert Rules Unconstitutional, ATLANTA
INJURY LAW BLOG, May 7,2005, http://www.atlantainjurylawblog.com; Daubert v. Merrell Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
208. See Chance, supra note 172.
209. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (Supp. 2005); see also Stephen Chance, SB3's Changes to O.C.G.A. §
9-11-9.1, Materials for SB 3 Seminar (Mar. 1,2005) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review).
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plaintiff. 210 Opponents of the Act have noted that, at least in certain
cases, this requirement could directly conflict with the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIP AA),
which Congress designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
private health information. 211 Under HIPAA, if a state law directly
conflicts with one of its provisions or regulations, HIPAA preempts
that state law. 212

Policy Issues
With the passage of caps on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases, the Georgia General Assembly has taken a step
towards controlling the increasing insurance rates for physicians in
the state. 213 But no one knows what effect this legislation will have.
Proponents of such caps point to similar legislation in other states
like Texas and Ohio, where insurance rates have decreased in the
h
214
.
years sInce
passage and
more'Insurers have returne d to testate.
Proponents often cite California, in particular, as the model of tort
reform, because it enacted a noneconomic damages cap in 1975 and
has effectively controlled insurance rates in recent years.215 But
opponents of damages caps note that California's insurance rates did
not truly lower until ten years after the legislature put the damages
cap in place-when the legislature passed insurance reform laws that
capped insurance rates. 216 Furthermore, opponents note that placing
limits on noneconomic damages results in denial of recovery to the
most severely injured victims and greatly reduces the potential
recovery for injured non-professionals-particularly homemakers

210. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209.
See 45 C.P.R. § 164.508 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209.
212. See 45 C.P.R. § 160.203 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209.
213. SB 3, as passed, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
214. See Michael Norbut, Three 'Crisis' States Show Improvement Since Tort Reform, HEALTH CARE
NEWS (May 1,2005), http://www.heartland.orglArticle.cfm?artId=16859; see also Senate Audio, supra
note II (remarks by Sen. John Wiles).
215. See William K. Scheuber & Bradford P. Cohn, California MICRA, the National Model in Tort
Reform, SAN FRANCISCO MEDICINE (Mar. 2(03).
216. See Medical Malpractice Fibs and Facts, http://www.iltla.com/Medical

211.

Malpractice/medmaIfibsandfacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
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and children. 217 The debate over the costs and benefits of damages
caps is ongoing and apparently endless. 218
Opponents of SB 3 also argue that the Act's abolition of joint and
several liability "results in a completely innocent plaintiff's inability
to collect the full amount of an award of damages.,,219 Furthermore,
they argue that this change is likely to increase litigation, because it
encourages defendants to seek "as many other responsible parties as
possible in order to decrease its relative degree of total fault.'.22O
Also, plaintiffs will have little incentive to settle with defendants
because other defendants will later exaggerate the settling
defendant's negligence to reduce their own proportional liability. 221
Finally, by forcing juries to consider not only the liability of the
litigants but also non-parties, the Act adds to the complexity of
litigation and stands to increase the associated costS. 222
While proponents of the Act's "offer of judgment" provision argue
that it encourages parties to accept reasonable settlement offers and
will decrease litigation, opponents argue that such measures are
unnecessary, as "95% of civil cases filed are [already] settled without
the need for trial.,,223 Furthermore, opponents argue that wealthy
defendants could bully private citizen plaintiffs into accepting "low
ball" offers out of fear that they will have to pay attorney's fees that
"could financially destroy the net worth of a middle class citizen.,,224
Opponents point out that the American Bar Association's model law
on offers of judgment caps the amount recoverable by an offering
defendant at the amount of the plaintiff's award-preventing a
plaintiff from having to pay more than the he recovers. 225 The ABA's
217.
See, e.g., Kevin Lamb, Exposing the Myths of Tort Reform, DAYTON DAILY NEWS
(Ohio), Oct. 26, 2004, at E2; see also Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. Steve
Thompson).
218. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
219. Charles M. Cork, m, S83: Abolition of Joint Liability, in INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL
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model law also allows the judge discretion to reduce or eliminate fees
to avoid hardship or injustice. 226
Opponents also argue that instead of decreasing litigation, section
5 could increase litigation by dividing each lawsuit into two trials:
one on the merits of the case, and another to determine whether a
party is entitled to costs based on the adequacy or inadequacy of an
offer of judgment. 227 Finally, opponents note that there is no legal
duty to settle a case, that no party should suffer for insisting on the
litigation of a nonfrivolous claim, and that it is "unfair to punish a
Party ... simply because the Party has no crystal ball upon which to
accurately predict the jury verdict in a tort trial.,,228

Conclusion
While some see the passage of SB 3 as the first step towards major
civil justice reform in Georgia, the Act's drafting and policy choices
leave questions as to how effective it will be in practice. 229 The next
legislative session will undoubtedly see the proposal of legislation
intended not only to further reform the civil justice system, but also
to remedy some of the constitutional problems that have become
apparent since the passage of the Act. 230 In the meantime, attorneys
will continue to challenge the constitutionality of SB 3, and courts
will continue to decide the validity of the Act's provisions. As both
politicians and the public continue to debate the pros and cons of tort
reform, only time will tell whether the benefits of such legislation
outweigh the costs.
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